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 This thesis presents a framework for resiliency planning in state departments of 
transportation and other transportation agencies. The development of this framework is 
motivated by the need for more resilient transportation systems, due of the increasing 
frequency and the effect both natural and manmade catastrophic disasters have on 
transportation systems.  
The resiliency framework is based on the urban transportation planning 
framework and is thus applied in the broader context of general transportation planning. 
The resiliency framework is then applied in a preliminary review to three statewide 
transportation plans to show the resiliency deficiencies of those plans and how the 
framework may be applied to increase resiliency. These plans are selected from three 
different states with diversity of locations and without any preconceived notions about 
their incorporation of resiliency in their planning process.  
This preliminary review reveals a reactive nature towards investments that 
increase an agency’s resilience. This may be attributed to the problem of limited funding 
for transportation investments, as well as, limited knowledge by the transportation 
agencies about the return on such resiliency investments, mostly due to the uncertainty 
associated with the occurrence of catastrophic disasters, especially the predictability of 
weather-related events. However, post-disaster transportation system overhauls provide 
enough evidence for the need for more systemic ways of addressing resiliency in 









 The world as we know it still exists because nature has proven over millennia to 
be resilient. In the study of behavior patterns of ecosystems, it is seen that ecosystems are 
constantly failing or collapsing, leading to a phase of reorganization ensuring survival 
(Fisher, 2013). In the same way, humans are not immune to ecosystem collapse; on the 
contrary, if recent events are any indications, “we are in the midst of an ecosystem 
collapse” (Fisher, 2013). Natural disaster statistics worldwide indicate an upwards trend 
in the number of disasters reported as well as, incurred economic losses (EM-DAT, 
2009). In the year 2000 alone, there were over 500 reported natural disasters which 
affected ten or more people; caused at least one hundred fatalities; required international 
assistance or called for a state of emergency (EM-DAT, 2009). According to the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), between 1991 
and 2000, an average of 211 million people were either affected or died from a natural 
disaster (CRS, 2002). During that same decade an average of 1,300 people were killed 
across the world every week (CRS, 2002).   Figure 1.1 shows total number of natural 
disasters reported across the world from 1900 to 2010 which clearly shows an 
exponential rise. 
 Natural disasters have a significant impact on the U.S. economy, with their costs 
rising progressively as they increase in frequency and intensity. This is proven by the fact 
that six of the 10 costliest disasters in U.S. history took place after the year 2000. In 2011 
alone, economic damages from natural disasters in the U.S. were well over $55 billion, 
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the highest since the first of such reported data in 1980. The cost of these disasters to 




Figure 1.1: Number of natural disasters reported worldwide from 1900-2010                                   
Source: EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database-www.emdat.be-Universite Catholique de Louvain, 
Brussels-Belgium 
 
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), as of January 2012, received Emergency 
Relief (ER) funding requests of about $2.967 billion for the repair and reconstruction of 
roads classified as federal highways which were damaged in 2005 during hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma (Kirk, 2012). Similarly, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act 
of 2013 made available $2.02 billion for the FHWA’s emergency relief program. 
Consequently, the FHWA on February 15, 2013 allocated $287million to the state of 
New York, of which $250 million was meant solely for Hurricane Sandy repair and 
reconstruction (FHWA, 2013).  
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 In addition, of the 38,345 terrorist incidents around the world between 1969 and 
2009, 7.8% (2,981) of these were directed against the U.S., causing nearly 5,600 fatalities 
and 16,300 injuries (Muhlhausen and McNeil, 2011). According to the Heritage 
Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis, calculations based on data from the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism show that exactly 20 of these terrorist attacks have 
directly targeted transportation.  
 Even without the looming threats of natural disasters and terrorist activity, 
resilience must still be advocated in light of the country’s aging critical infrastructure, 
which the 2011 National Risk Profile lists alongside extreme weather and pandemics as 
creating vulnerabilities which increase risk (DHS, 2011). According to the American 
Society of Engineers (ASCE), one in four (26%) bridges in the United States (U.S.) is 
either structurally deficient or functionally obsolete and a third of all major roads are also 
either in poor or mediocre condition (ASCE, 2009). To substantially improve the 
condition of our bridges and highways, an annual investment of about $17 billion and 
$186 billion respectively is required (ASCE, 2009). 
 Finally, the increasing interdependency of critical infrastructure in the U.S. has 
led to an increased vulnerability to cascading failures. The transportation system is one of 
16 defined critical infrastructure systems which the Patriot Act defines as “…systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” 
(D.H.S, n.d.). The failure of transportation infrastructure during natural disasters 
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exacerbates the consequences of these disasters by breaking the connectivity between 
other critical infrastructure such as hospitals and emergency shelters.  
 The increasing frequency of catastrophic events due to extreme weather, aging 
infrastructure and terrorist attacks are substantiation for the need for a reorganization of 
long standing planning approaches and operational methods into more resilient 
approaches. Traditional approaches to strengthening transportation infrastructure have 
focused on resistance, which primarily focuses on pre-disaster mitigation measures to 
enhance the performance of infrastructure elements. Resilience, on the other hand is 
concerned with improving the capacity of systems, not only through pre-disaster 
mitigation measures, but also in their ability to respond to and recover quickly from 
disasters or disruptions.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 Although resiliency in transportation has been studied in limited detail, there is 
still lack of a well-structured and accepted application of this concept to transportation 
systems. There is a need to apply resiliency concepts to the transportation planning 
process, thereby addressing issues related to disruptions caused by natural disasters early 
in the decision making process.  
1.2 Objective 
 The objective of this work is to:  
I. Provide an overview on the impacts of some natural disasters to linear 
transportation infrastructure systems such as roads, rail, and bridges. 
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II. Offer a resiliency planning framework which incorporates resiliency concepts into 
the transportation planning process. 
1.3 Scope 
The disasters discussed are limited to their effects on the United States, that is, this thesis 
focuses on hurricane landfalls, damages and fatalities.  
 
1.4 Order of Thesis 
 Chapter one gives the background and motivation for the research. Chapter two 
provides summaries of the impacts of disasters to some transportation infrastructure, as 
well as a review of resiliency concepts and its application in transportation engineering. 
In chapter three, the resiliency planning framework is presented. The framework is then 
used to evaluate elements of resiliency in three long-range transportation plans from three 
state departments of transportation in chapter four. Finally, this thesis ends with a 








 This section of the thesis will first provide an overview of the impacts of some 
natural disasters on transportation infrastructure in the U.S. It will then introduce the 
concept of resiliency, its applications and metrics for measurements. 
 
2.1 Impacts of Disasters on Transportation Infrastructure 
2.1.1 Hurricane Katrina 
 Hurricane Katrina was a category three hurricane that first made landfall on the 
29
th
 of August, 2005 as a category one near Miami, Florida, then later as a category three 
with sustained wind strengths of about 125 mph and minimum pressure of 920 mbar, 
causing severe damage along the Louisiana-Mississippi-Alabama coasts. There were 
approximately 1,800 fatalities, with about a million more people displaced making it the 
deadliest hurricane since the Okeechobee hurricane in 1928 which claimed more than 
4,000 lives. It is perhaps worthy to note that the majority of the damage caused by 
hurricane Katrina was not because of the wind strength or the rain from the storm itself, 
but rather from the storm surge and levee breaches which caused the subsequent flooding. 
Much of the destruction occurred in the City of New Orleans which had about 80% of the 
city submerged, leaving about 100,000 people trapped with no power, food or drinking 
water. The dire circumstances after the hurricane left residents in a state of fear 
compounded by fifteen percent of the police force walking off. The destruction and loss 
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from the hurricane affected not only the local economies but the national economy too. 
The national oil industry was probably the hardest hit with the daily Gulf of Mexico oil 
production reduced by 95% due to 30 damaged oil platforms, nine closed refineries and 
oil spills from 44 facilities, resulting in more than 26 million liters of oil being leaked. In 
total, hurricane Katrina is estimated to have caused $125 billion (2007 dollars) in 
damages. 
 
2.1.1.1 The Hurricane Protection System 
 Although the hurricane protection system is not transportation infrastructure, it is 
important to take note that deficiencies in this system were the main cause of most of the 
destruction in New Orleans. The main components that were damaged were the levees, 
the canals and interior drainage and pumping stations. The characteristics of these 
systems made their failure inevitable in the face of a hurricane such as Katrina. The 
inadequacies of the design of the hurricane protection system were not exposed mostly 
because the design was not subject to rigorous review by experts. The piecemeal 
construction of levees, along with inaccuracies in the construction process, was also 
brought up in hindsight reviews (ASCE, 2007). In retrospect, failure of the hurricane 
protection system has been attributed to two facts: that there was no single agency in 
charge of hurricane protection in New Orleans and that there was a lack of inter-agency 
coordination among the agencies in charge. Activities such as maintenance of levees and 
pumps were spread over many agencies with federal, state, parish and local jurisdictions 





 Over 45 bridges sustained damage in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. These 
were mostly bridges located near water. Damages were mostly to the superstructure with 
little or no damage to the substructure and were generally caused by four main problems 
(Kazez, and Vipulanandan, 2010): (1) storm surge - mostly induced loading which caused 
damages such as breakages in the connections between pilings and piers, as well as 
unseated decks and further damage to guardrails in both fixed type and movable bridges, 
(2) bridge scour- caused by the moving water which gradually removed sediment from 
the bridge piers and thereby weakened the structure (Warren, 2011); (3) inundation – 
caused damage to mostly electrical and mechanical components which mostly affected 
movable bridges and (4) High winds – this contributed to other modes of failure by 
raising the probability of occurrence, such as damage from debris, including loose barges 
and boats. Some vital bridges that were damaged were I-10 Twin Span Bridge, the 
Pontchartrain Causeway, St. Louis Bay Bridge and the Biloxi Bridge. During repairs 
carried out, most bridges were elevated about six meters higher than their original levels. 
Recommendations for improved bridge design included vertical constraint devices, air 
vents in bridge diaphragms and transverse shear keys to prevent lateral shifting 
(DesRoches, and Rix, 2006). These were anticipated to be effective in reducing damage. 
Sophisticated equipment such as monitoring systems, sensors and a weight motion scale 
were also installed on some bridges. The overall cost of repair and replacement, including 





2.1.1.3 Roads and Rail 
 Roads were mostly either submerged or rendered inaccessible due to significant 
debris deposits by the hurricane. Some sections of roads such as the Louisiana Highway 
23 (LA 23) in south Louisiana were also torn apart. There was also significant damage to 
utilities, traffic signals and signs, driveway aprons, curbs, ramps and road paving. Rail 
roads suffered from broken anchor bolts and damaged angle clips, with a substantial 
amount of debris and barges causing major disruption to rail traffic. Among the major 
railroads and highways damaged were Norfolk Southern’s five-mile-long Lake 
Pontchartrain Bridge, CSX’s railroad tracks east of the Saint Louis Bay, and the U.S. 90 
Biloxi-Ocean Springs. Railroad reconstruction saw a shift from the use of anchor bolts to 
through rods on connections to precast I-girders. Also, corrosion protection was ensured 
by coating the reinforcement bars and using high performance concrete. In total, there 
was an estimated $200 million for debris removal (TCLEE, 2006).  
 
2.1.1.4 Ports 
 The river and coastal ports facilities affected by Hurricane Katrina sustained a 
wide variety of damage, ranging from minor wind damage to complete inundation. High 
winds, storm surge and failure of the levees were among the main causes of damage 
(Curtis, 2007) which included flooding, damage to container cranes and a reported fire at 
Mandeville Wharf in New Orleans. The Port of Gulfport in Mississippi was the hardest 
hit in terms of structural damage as it suffered a direct hit from the hurricane (Frittelli, 
2005). Other hindrances to port operations were the lack of power and the displacement 
of workers due to the storm damage (Curtis, 2007). According to the National Oceanic 
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and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Port of New Orleans alone was estimated 
to have accrued a $250 billion loss, in both to port facility damage and disrupted 
commerce, with the latter making up $20 million of the total sum (NOAA, n.d.).   
 On the whole, there was a high level of government criticism in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, partly due to the fact that knowledge of New Orleans’ vulnerability 
was not hidden from national agencies, on the contrary, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) had previously rated New Orleans and San Francisco as 
the top two cities most vulnerable to catastrophic natural disasters.  
 
2.1.2 Hurricane Ike 
 Hurricane Ike at peak intensity was a category four hurricane but made final 
landfall near Galveston in Texas on September 13
th
, 2008 as a category two hurricane. 
This was the costliest hurricane in Texas history and the third costliest in U.S. history. 
The hurricane was the fifth hurricane of the 2008 Atlantic hurricane season with 
sustained winds of 145 mph and a minimum pressure of 935 mbar. Hurricane Ike also 
recorded the second highest integrated kinetic energy (IKE) for an Atlantic storm in the 
past forty years. The hurricane caused damages from the Louisiana coastline to Kennedy 
County in Texas, with flooding damage along the Mississippi coast and the northwestern 
part of Florida (Florida Panhandle) resulting in $30 billion in damages in the U.S. alone 
(Blake et al., 2011). In subsequent weeks, the State of Texas estimated $131.8 million for 
transportation system damage repair costs, with $53.7 million allocated to road and 
bridge repairs and $78.1 million to debris removal from public rights-of-way and 
recovery efforts by city and county governments (FEMA, 2008). The Texas Department 
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of Transportation (TxDOT) also required an estimated $36.5 million for debris removal 
not carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (FEMA. 2008). The hurricane 
caused 103 direct deaths which were attributed to severe flooding, wind, electrocution 
and car crashes during the storm (Berg, 2009). 
 
2.1.2.1 Bridges 
 Approximately 53 bridges in the Houston/Galveston area sustained damage 
primary due to a combination of storm surge and wave forces. This caused impact 
damage from large debris carried by floodwaters to bridges such as the Union Springs 
Bridge and the Rice Belt Road Bridges (State of Texas, 2009). Scour was also common 
in local bridges such as the single-span 3400 Rocky Shore Bridge and the two-span CR-
3625 Ebenezer Church Road Bridge (State of Texas, 2009). Most the bridges damaged 
were timber structures in rural areas but some major bridges with more than five spans, 
made of steel and concrete were also damaged (Stearns and Padgett, 2011). The Humble 
Camp Bridge at Hildebrandt Bayou, the Rollover Pass Bridge and the Pelican Island 
Bridge (AADT of 6,520) were among some of the major bridges damaged from storm 
surge and wave loading (Bridgehunter.com, 2013; Stearns and Padgett, 2011).  
 
2.1.2.2 Roads and Rail 
 Roadbeds and shoulders along several miles of roads were washed out from the 
flooding, for example the five-mile section along the State Highway 87 in Texas. Ninety 
percent of traffic signals in Houston were either damaged or not functioning due to loss 
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of power. State Highway 87 and portions of County Road 257 in Brazoria County are 
among some roads that were severely damaged. In the aftermath however, emergency 
contracts were issued to repair signals and traffic detection systems. State highways and 
roads that served as barriers to protecting wetlands were also prioritized during repairs 
(FEMA, 2008).  Railroad tracks were littered with debris deposits of blown-down trees 
and power lines even up to locations 180 miles from the coast. There were also 
embankment washouts and removal of decks and caps off trestles. On the Galveston 
Causeway, about 1.5 miles of concrete curb was broken, crushed stone ballast washed out 
and tracks washed out of line. Union Pacific also had about a mile of their tracks shifted 
off the road bed. In New Orleans, repairs conducted on 21 miles of railroad tracks that 
were damaged by Hurricane Gustav were washed away. There was also significant wind 
damage to railroad buildings. According to the American Association of Railroads, there 
was a steep decline of 7.8% in freight transported by the major U.S railroads. Emergency 
repairs and cleaning out carried on railroads restored service on high priority lines within 
an average of two days, and in about a week on less important lines. The Galveston 
Railway, connected to the Port of Galveston was reported to have sustained $628,000 in 
damages to offices, trains and railroad tracks (FEMA, 2008).  
 
2.1.2.3 Ports/Canals  
 There was erosion damage to the Galveston seawall and the Galveston/Bolivar 
Ferry operations were disrupted due to extensive damage to hydraulic systems caused by 
salt water intrusion. The Port of Galveston also sustained extensive damage (FEMA, 
2008). The U.S. Army allocated $25 million for rehabilitation of the seawall. There was 
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also an estimated $2.4 billion invested by the State of Texas to carry out repairs for 
damages caused by erosion, as well as to waterways, ports and coastlines (FEMA, 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Hurricane Ivan  
 Hurricane Ivan was at peak strength a category 5 hurricane which reduced to 
category 3 at landfall near the Gulf Shores in Alabama east of Mobile on September 16
th
, 
2004 (USGS, 2013). At final landfall in southwest Louisiana, it was further reduced to a 
tropical depression on the 24
th
 of September, 2004. Hurricane Ivan was one of only 12 
recorded depressions to become storms given its early location south of 10EN (NOAA, 
2012). At peak intensity, hurricane Ivan sustained winds of up to 165 mph and pressures 
as low as 910 mbar. There were also storm surge heights of 10- 15 feet along the Gulf 
Coast during its first U.S. landfall (NOAA, 2012). The hurricane caused beach and dune 
erosion (State of Florida EPA, 2004), severe flooding damage and landslides, and 
initiated 117 tornadoes across the eastern part of the U.S. Different areas across Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi were affected by the 
hurricane. Consequently, Hurricane Ivan caused 25 direct and 32 indirect deaths in the 
U.S. which were as a result of tornados (7), storm surge (5), fresh water floods (4), mud 
slides (4), wind (3) and surf (2) (Stewart, 2004). The distributions of deaths across the 
U.S. are as follows: 14 in Florida, 8 in North Carolina, 2 in Georgia, and 1 in Mississippi 
(Stewart, 2004). There were 67 other deaths reported deaths in Grenada, Jamaica, 
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Cayman Islands, Tobago and Barbados (Stewart, 2004). 
The coastal areas sustained the most severe damages in terms of structural damage and 
beach erosion (State of Florida EPA, 2004). Some inland areas were also damaged, as 
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well as offshore drilling operations. According to the State of Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources, Hurricane Ivan destroyed seven oil platforms, combined with causing 
2.7% and 4.9% of the Gulf of Mexico’s annual gas and oil production respectively to 
shut-in (State of Louisiana, 2004). There was also extensive damage to pipelines with 
some pipelines at the mouth of the Mississippi River moved as far as 3,000 feet and 
others also buried under 30 feet of mud (State of Louisiana, 2004). 
Damages from the hurricane are totaled at $18 billion with about $800 - $900 million 
sustained by the U.S. Naval Air Station in Pensacola Florida (EM-DAT, 2009; Stewart, 
2004).  
 
2.1.3.1  Bridges 
 The Escambia Bay Bridges on the Interstate 10 were among the most severely 
damaged during the hurricane with parts of the bridge either toppled or shifted out of 
alignment. Parts of the Bob Sikes Bridge in Santa Rosa County in Florida sustained 
heavy damage but reopened after about a week to Santa Rosa residents only (AARoads, 
2011). The Navarre Beach Causeway, also in Santa Rosa County sustained heavy 
structural damage and was closed until November 3, 2004 (AARoads, 2011). Portions of 
the I-10 Bridge across Pensacola Bay, Florida, sustained severe damages at various 
locations along its length caused by storm surge and wave action resulting in parts of the 
bridge collapsing into the bay (State of Florida EPA, 2004). The U.S 98 Lillian Highway 




2.1.3.2 Roads  
 Storm surge and water flow across roads caused severe damage, from overtopping 
to scour, washouts, undercutting, subsidence and burying of roads by sand. There was 
also wave attack on revetment slopes, which affected roads nearby. In Alabama, State 
Road 182 sustained damage from a breach by flood waters and the Florida 399 between 
Pensacola Beach and Navarre Beach was also damaged. Other roads damaged were the 
Perdido Key county Road 292, Florida 292 and the U.S 98 approach to Pensacola 
(Douglass et al., 2004). Damaged roads in Alabama alone cost an estimated $28 million 
according to state transportation officials (McGrew, 2004). The North Carolina 
Department of Transportation received a total of $27.1 million from the North Carolina 
Division of Emergency Management (NCDEM) to pay for projects related to debris 
removal, road repairs and bridge replacements (DHS, 2011).  
 
2.1.4 Hurricane Wilma 
 Hurricane Wilma is the fourth costliest storm in U.S history. It made landfall in 
southwest Florida as a Category 3 hurricane on October 24, 2005. It had wind speeds of 
up to 185 mph and a minimum pressure of 882 mbar, making it the lowest central 
pressure recorded for an Atlantic hurricane since Hurricane Gilbert of September, 1988 
(NOAA, 2012).  The hurricane affected parts of Mexico, Cuba and Florida which resulted 
in ten tornadoes between 23-24 October in Florida alone (NOAA, 2012). One in each of 
the following counties: Collier, Hardee, Highlands, Indian River, Okeechobee, and Polk, 
and four in Brevard County (Pasch et al., 2006).  Hurricane Wilma caused a total of 23 
fatalities, five of which were in Florida with the other 18 divided between Haiti (12), 
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Jamaica (1), Mexico (4) and Bahamas (1) (Pasch et al., 2006). The hurricane caused 
water shortages and loss of power after the storm. According to Florida Power and Light, 
approximately 6 million people were without power including the entire Florida Keys 
area, with some for as long as 2-3 weeks (NCDC, 2005). The lack of electrical power led 
to gasoline shortages and inoperative sewage systems. This was the largest power 
disruption to be experienced by Florida with up to 98% of South Florida without power 
(Pasch et al., 2006).  Total damage estimates for hurricane Wilma were estimated to be 
$14.3 billion (EM-DAT, 2009). 
 
2.1.4.1 Bridges 
 In South Florida, there was some structural damage to bridges such as the Marco 
Island Bridge which sustained some scour (Steimle, 2009). The Max Brewer Crossway 
Bridge between Titusville and Playlinda Beach was also closed due to impact damage 
sustained from a loose boat (SERT, 2005). Other damages were as a result of flooding 
and wave action around piers (Dillon, 2006). Estimates for eight Marco bridges damaged 
during the hurricane sum up to about $1 million, excluding the east Winterberry Drive 
Bridge whose estimate is $4.4 million (Kaiser, 2005).  
 
2.1.4.2 Roads and Rail 
 Substantial signal and sign damage on state roads and I-95 (SERT, 2005). Only 
18 out of Miami’s 2600 traffic signals were left working. An estimated $40 million spent 
on traffic signal repairs (Turnbell, 2006). Florida received $480 million towards costs for 
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replacing signals, clearing highway debris, and repairing roads across 21 counties for 
damages caused by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma (Roads & Bridges, 2006). 
 Hurricane Wilma also caused some rail damage, although not as widespread, Tri-
Rail services in Miami was shut down for 17 days (SFRTA, 2011). The Railway also 
suspended service for 14 days until the tracks were all cleared. The hurricane was 
estimated to reduce Florida East Coast Railway’s (FECR) fourth quarter revenues by 
about $1.5 to $2.5 million (FECI, 2005). Estimated cost incurred by FECR for clean-up, 
property damage and grade crossing operations was between $2.5 and $3 million (FECI, 
2005).  
 
2.1.5 Hurricane Irene 
 Hurricane Irene made its first landfall in North Carolina on August 27, 2011 as a 
category 1 hurricane and its final landfall as a tropical storm in New York City on August 
28, 2011 (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011). The hurricane’s highest sustained wind speed was 
120mph in the Bahamas as a category 3 hurricane, however, highest gust in the U.S was 
83 mph. Flooding records were broken in 26 rivers: in New Jersey, 14 in New York and 4 
in Vermont (NOAA, 2011). Forty-nine direct deaths were attributed to Hurricane Irene: 
41 in the U.S, 5 in the Dominican Republic and 3 in Haiti (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011). 
The causes of deaths in the U.S. were storm surge (6), wind (15) and floods (21) (Avila 
and Cangialosi, 2011). Hurricane Irene caused severe wind damage causing downed trees 
and power lines; however, its most devastating impacts were major floods caused by 
torrential rainfall (Lubchenco and Furgione, 2012). Severe flooding and storm surge 
affected Vermont, New York, New Jersey, northern New Hampshire, North Carolina and 
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Connecticut (Lubchenco and Furgione, 2012). In New York, a storm surge of between 3-
6 feet was experienced (Lubchenco and Furgione, 2012). Flood levels in southern 
Vermont caused damage to 2400 roads, 300 businesses, 800 homes and businesses, and 6 
railroads either destroyed or damaged (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011). Impact to agriculture 
in New York, according to the governor, was estimated at $45 million (Avila and 
Cangialosi, 2011). According to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
Bureau of Dam Safety, six dams failed as a result of the storm on August 14, caused by 
the hurricane (New Jersey Water Science Center, 2013). In New York, high flood levels 
left five towns in the Catskill Mountains completely dilapidated; Prattsville, Windham, 
Tannersville, Phoenicia and Margaretville (McKnight, 2012). In Connecticut and Long 
Island, heavy rains and wind caused power outages to more than 3 million residents for 
about a week (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011). In total, 8 million people were without power 
after Hurricane Irene hit (Lubchenco and Furgione, 2012).  
 The hurricane also caused several flight cancellations, airport closures and 
suspended rail service. Several airports were affected, including John F. Kennedy 
Airport, Newark Liberty International, LaGuardia Airport, Stewart International and 
Philadelphia International Airport, causing approximately 11,800 cancelled flights 
affecting 650,000 travelers (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011).  In total, damages caused in the 
U.S were estimated at $15.8 billion (Avila and Cangialosi, 2011).   
 
2.1.5.1 Roads and Bridges 
 In Vermont, a total of 263 roads and bridges were washed out with damages 
exceeding $700 million (Mackin, 2012). Thirty state bridges and 260 roads were also 
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closed down in Vermont which cut off access to 10 towns (Associated Press, 2011).  
Damage to roads consisted of sediment deposit within roadside drainage, loss of 
embankments and other damages to culverts and headwalls. In North Carolina, over 270 
roads and 21 bridges suffered damaged from flooding and debris deposits, and were 
subsequently closed down (Lubchenco and Furgione, 2012). The Allen Road in 
Tannersville-New York had 100 feet of its pavement washed out with resulting erosion 
damage that exposed sewers and water mains (NYC-EP, 2013). Repairs in the area 
included debris removal, replacement of utilities and guardrails, as well as rebuilding 
washed out parts of the road, and slope stabilization. Reports from the City of New York 
Department of Environmental Protection (NYCEP) also stated that there were substantial 
damages to the Schoharie Bridge on New York State Route 990V in Gilboa, the Bushkill 
Bridge on Route 28A in West Shokan, and the Lowes Corner Bridge on Route 55A in 
Grahamsville. The Schoharie Bridge lost 245 feet and 189 feet of bank protection on the 
eastern and western abutments respectively. Repairs carried out on the bridge include 
providing temporary access from Route 990V, provision of cofferdams and fortifying the 
retaining walls. According to NYC Environmental Protection, repairs to the Allen Road, 
the Schoharie Bridge, the Bushkill Bridge, and the Lowes Corner Bridge, summed up to a 
total of $2.1 million (NYC-EP, 2013). Total aid awarded in New York State for 
transportation costs incurred during Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee was 
estimated at $297 million (NYC Governor’s Press Office, 2012). In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s Federal highway Administration provided approximately 
$45 million towards the repair and replacement federal highways damaged in 




 Apart from the halt on transit rail service operations preceding the hurricane; there 
was also heavy damage to railroads. In Vermont, the FEMA Public Assistance program 
approved 80 rail related repair and replacement projects. These comprise 16 bridge 
projects at $18.3 million and 64 railroad track projects at $3.7 million, totaling $22 
million, of which FEMA’s Public Assistance program pays 90 percent (FEMA, 2013). In 
Philadelphia, 16 regional railroad cars were partially flooded with 12 reported to have 
been left with long term damage (Campisi, 2011). New York City’s Metro Transit 
Authority (MTA) also submitted claims of $65 million, of which FEMA has approved 
$27.7 million for 59 projects (Yang, 2012).  
 
2.1.6 Hurricane Sandy 
 Hurricane Sandy was a category 1 hurricane which weakened to a post-tropical 
cyclone at landfall on October 29, 2012, south of Atlantic City- New Jersey with 
maximum winds of up to 155mph and minimum pressure of 940 mbar (Sharp, 2012). It 
was an extremely large hurricane, at 900 miles in diameter; its area was about 150 
percent the size of Texas (Burnson, 2012). It initially made landfall in Caribbean on 
October 25, causing extensive damage in Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba (Center for Disaster 
Philanthropy, 2013). In New York, the hurricane had storm surge levels of up to 12.65 
feet and storm tides (the combination of surge and tide) of up 14.06 feet (Blake et al., 
2013). Hurricane Sandy affected states across the southeast, mid-Atlantic, Appalachia 
and mid-west of the U.S. These were New York, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Florida and New Jersey. In southeast 
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Florida, though the hurricane did not make landfall, it caused some coastal flooding and 
substantial beach erosion (National Weather Service, 2012). In Miami-Dade County, 
resulting wave heights were reported to have been between 10 -20 feet high (National 
Weather Service, 2012). In Palm Beach County alone, damages from Hurricane Sandy 
were totaled at $14 million (National Weather Service, 2012).  
 Hurricane Sandy caused at least 72 direct and 87 indirect deaths in the U.S., the 
highest number of deaths caused by a tropical cyclone in the northeast since Hurricane 
Agnes of 1972 (Blake et al., 2013). Overall death estimates remain at 147 direct and 138 
indirect deaths, with storm surge accounting for 57% of U.S. deaths (Blake et al., 2013). 
Other causes of deaths were flooding, hypothermia, car crashes, falling trees, fires, and 
carbon monoxide poisoning (Serna, 2012). In all, Hurricane Sandy caused over $75 
billion in damages, making it the second costliest hurricane to hit the U.S. after Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 (Nevitt, 2013). 
 
2.1.6.1 Roads and Rail 
 The New York and New Jersey Transit systems suffered dramatic losses as a 
result of the storm. Roads suffered embankment washouts, shoulder drop-offs, tilted 
street light poles, excessive debris, damaged traffic signals and signs. There was also 
flooding damage as a result of weak dune structures and storm surge. All seven tunnels 
the East River flooded, as well as one subway bridge, three subway yards and six bus 
facilities. According to MTA NYC Transit, the Rockaway Flats line which runs between 
Howard Beach and the Barrier Island, sustained severe damage leaving 35,000 customers 
stranded. There were track washouts and destroyed fences, as well as loose boats, oil 
22 
 
tanks, logs and significant debris deposited on the tracks. All seven East River tunnels 
were flooded (New York Times, 2012). Electrical components at rail stations such as plus 
signals and mechanical rooms suffered severe damage from the flooding. MTA sustained 
an estimated cost of about $5 billion in damage and lost revenue (Blake et al., 2013). 
According to New Jersey Transit, the transit system sustained damages to 62 of their 203 
locomotives and 261 of their 1,162 rail cars. In total, New Jersey Transit sustained an 
estimated $400 million in damages (Levin, 2012).  Amtrak has asked Congress for a total 
of $336 million as a result of damages caused by Hurricane Sandy; $276 million of the 
amount is to be used for improvements at the Penn Station in New York (Levin, 2012). 
Total funding from the Emergency Relief Fund of the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) for New Jersey is estimated at $ 224 million (U.S.DOT, 2013). These funds will 
be used to reimburse the state for repairs to damaged highways and bridges caused by the 
storm. An estimated $800 million in needed for improvements to protect the system 
against future storms (Levin, 2012).  
 In summary, whether we are facing sudden external threats such as natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks, or internal threats such as design flaws and construction 
errors, the overall hazard (a function of threat likelihood, threat consequence and system 
resilience) may be reduced to the barest minimum by increasing system resilience (Labi, 
2013). Table 2.1 is a summary of the nine most expensive natural disasters to hit the U.S. 





Table 2.1: Top nine natural disasters in the United States sorted by economic damage costs        
(1984-2013) 
Date Disaster Damage (billion US$) 
08/29/2005 Hurricane Katrina 125 
10/28/2012 Hurricane Sandy 75 
01/17/1994 Northridge Earthquake 30 
09/12/2008 Hurricane Ike 30 
08/24/1992 Hurricane Andrew 26.5 
09/15/2004 Hurricane Ivan 18 
09/23/2005 Hurricane Rita 16 
08/13/2004 Hurricane Charley 16 




2.2 Defining Resilience 
The word resilience is obtained from the Latin verb “resilio”, which means to 
rebound (Rose, 2009). The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines resilience as “an 
ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change”. Resilience as a concept 
has been defined differently by several authors in different domains. In systems, it has 
been defined by Tamvakis and Xenidis (2012), as “the ability of a system to react from 
stresses that challenge its performance” and also by Croope et al. (2010) as “the ability of 
a system to withstand or respond to changes”. Ta et al. (2009) on the other hand, defines 
resilience for a freight transportation system as “the ability of a system to absorb the 
consequences of disruptions, to reduce the impacts of disruptions and maintain freight 
mobility’. In disaster research, resilience is defined as “…the ability of social units (e.g., 
organizations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when 
they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize social disruption and 
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mitigate the effects of future disasters” (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). The more popular 
and perhaps, most widespread definition of resilience is “the ability to accommodate 
change gracefully without any catastrophic failure” (Foster, 1997). According to 
Reggiani (2012), resilience may have two definitions, i) engineering resilience, based on 
the measuring the speed a system takes to return to equilibrium (Pimm, 1984) and ii) 
ecological resilience, the agitation, perturbation or disturbance that can be absorbed by a 
system before it is displaced from one state to another (Holling, 1973, 1986, 1992).  
 Resilience is commonly described as having dimensions, properties or 
characteristics. Though defined differently in the literature, these terms inherently stand 
for characteristics that describe the nature of a resilient system.  The most common of 
these is the R4 Framework developed by the by the Multidisciplinary Center for 
Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER).  According to Tierney and Bruneau (2007), 
this consists of: 
i. Robustness: This describes the inherent strength or ability to withstand disasters 
without significant degradation. 
ii. Redundancy: The extent to which other system units can be substituted to perform 
other functions to maintain system performance 
iii. Resourcefulness: The system’s ability to “diagnose, prioritize and initiate 
solutions” (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). 
iv. Rapidity: The time it takes to restore the system’s functionality 
Other characteristics of resiliency that have been identified in the literature 
 Resiliency is also said to have three aspects (Reggiani, 2012). That is, a resilient 
system should show a reduced probability of failure, reduced consequences of failure, 
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and reduced time to recovery. These should be targeted by specific strategies which form 
a system’s mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies (Ta et al., 2009). 
Systems may also show inherent or adaptive resilience (Cox et al., 2010; Tierney and 
Bruneau, 2007). Inherent resilience is shown by systems with resources that provide the 
ability to deal with crises. For example, the aftermath of the London 2005 bombing 
which saw a general mode shift from heavy rail to other modes such as bus, was only 
possible due to the availability of bus services. Such resources already in place may be 
“…enhanced prior to a disaster and so that capabilities that are not damaged or eroded 
can be implemented in the disaster aftermath” (Cox et al., 2010). Adaptive resilience on 
the other hand, is an ability to maintain functionality during a disruption or to speed up 
the recovery process by some special measures such as working overtime.  
 
2.2.1 Applications of Resilience 
 The concept of resiliency has arisen in the study of disruptions in various 
disciplines; supply chains, enterprises, infrastructure and disaster research. In Sheffi and 
Rice’s (2005) study of disruptions of enterprise supply chains, they state that the nature 





Figure 2.1: The eight stages of a company's disruption profile 
(Source: Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
  
 The initial stage is the preparation stage. This is a common characteristic of cases 
in which early warnings are issued, for example tornado and hurricane alerts, or in other 
cases where prior events suggest imminent disruptions, for example, a strike action by 
company employees. The second stage is the disruptive event itself; the occurrence of an 
explosion or a supplier cut off for example. Third is the organization’s first response. 
This is usually targeted at containing the immediate situation to reduce the effects of the 
disruption and reduce losses. The initial impact is then experienced. Here, Sheffi and 
Rice suggest that the full impact of certain disruptions are not felt immediately, rather 
there’s an initial impact stage at which the company’s performance begins to decline at a 
rate which is a function of the “magnitude of the disruption, the available redundancy, 
and the inherent resilience of the organization and its supply chain” (Sheffi and Rice, 
2005). The fifth stage is the full impact stage. As mentioned earlier, the onset of a full 
impact may be either immediate or delayed, however, once it sets in, there’s a drastic 
drop in performance. Following this is the recovery preparation stage which either starts 
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with the first response or before that, depending on whether or not the disruption is 
anticipated. These preparations may involve stocking up on inventories, finding alternate 
suppliers or finding alternate transportation routes or modes. The recovery stage involves 
the establishment and sanctioning of strategies to restore performance to pre-disruption 
levels. Last is the potential long-term impact disruptions may have on companies. For 
example, a supplier’s inability to meet a customer’s demand as a result of a disruption 
may cause a strained or damaged supplier-customer relationship.  
 In assessing the vulnerability of companies to these disruptions, Sheffi and Rice 
(2005) promote the use of “enterprise vulnerability maps” to characterize potential 
disruptions as functions of their probability and consequences. These maps designate 
threats as either i) low probability-low impact, ii) low probability-high impact, iii) high 
probability-low impact or iv) high probability-high impact. To address these 
vulnerabilities, they encourage building the resilience of companies, which he describes 
as being created by either redundancy or flexibility. However, flexibility is advocated in 
this work over redundancy because of the more common place results in daily operations 
produced by strategies to that build flexibility such as the use of informal networks which 
increase rapidity and good communication within and between organizations. 
Redundancy on the other hand, is described as less desirable due to its sometimes high 
cost of implementation and benefits which may not be realized until the occurrence of a 
major disruption (which have high impact but low probability of occurring).  
 In disaster research, the concept of the resilience triangle has also been developed 
to show the effect of a disruption and the time it takes to recover. Figure 2.2 shows the 
resilience triangle of a system with a 50% loss of functionality. The depth of the triangle 
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shows the severity of the damage, and the length shows the time until full recovery, that 
is, time t0 which is the onset of the disruption, to time t1, the pre-disaster conditions. The 
aim of building resiliency into a system is to reduce the size of this triangle, primarily 
through the adoption of various resilience strategies that target disruption mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery (Ta et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2.2: Resilience triangle showing 50% loss in functionality 
(Source: Ta et al., 2009) 
 
 
 Also in disaster research, systems are thought of as having four resilience 
domains (TOSE), these are the technical, organizational, social and economic domains 
(Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). The technical domain comprises all physical components 
of the system-- for example highways, bridges and ITS equipment. The organizational 
domain comprises the governing bodies or institutions in charge of the system; for 
example state DOTs and similar agencies. The social domain represents social groups 
and communities in contact and hence affected by the system. Last, the economic domain 
represents both local and foreign economies such as businesses which are linked to the 
system. According to Tierney and Bruneau (2007), useful resilience metrics may be 
developed for a system by combining the R4 framework with the TOSE domains, and 




 Work on freight system resiliency by Ta et al., (2009) introduces three dimensions 
which should be targeted by resilience strategies; the infrastructure, the user and the 
managing organization dimensions. Similar to the TOSE domains of disaster research, 
the infrastructure dimension represents the physical components of the freight system, 
that is the nodes (warehouses, ports) and links (railroads, bridges, roadways), as well as 
the information infrastructure built into them. The user dimension is made up of the 
individuals and organizations that use the system to transport people and goods. Last, the 
managing organization, as the name suggests, is the body in charge of construction, 
maintenance and daily functionality of the infrastructure (Ta et al., 2009). Table 2.2 
provides the definitions for the three resiliency dimensions as described by Ta et al., 
(2009).  Leu et al. (2010) also describes the transportation system as being made up of 
three distinct but interweaving layers: the physical layer consisting of roads, bridges, 
ports, equipment, machines, etc.; the service layer representing the actual flows in a 
system such as commute trips; and last, the cognitive layer which represents the human 
contributions to the transportation system. 
 




Ability of a network, given its capacity to supply lane miles, 
facilitate movement of good under capacity constrained conditions 





Ability to prepare for and respond to disruptions in a timely manner 
by effectively managing, allocating and deploying resources 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
User Resilience 
Ability to behave in a way that supports the system’s function. For 
example, preparedness of users 
  
 
 Transportation system resiliency has also been linked with its critical components 
having characteristics such as redundancy, diversity, interdependence, efficiency, 
autonomy of components, strength, adaptability, collaboration, mobility, safety, and 
recovery (Leu et al., 2010; Ta et al., 2009; VTPI, 2010; Tamvakis and Xendis, 2012). 
Table 2.3 provides a summary of some of the characteristics of resiliency based on Ta’s 
(2009) work on freight resiliency.  
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delivery 
Multiple parts and 
materials suppliers; 
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controls for each 
intersection 
Independence of 
functional units in an 
organization, e.g. 
approvals and decision 












state, regional and 
local public agencies 
to plan, construct 
Good internal 
communication across 








Table 2.3 (continued) 
 
and operate the full 
transportation 
network to optimize 
system use 
leadership across all 





that reduce travel 
time between origin 
and destination 
Use of effective 
mechanisms to 
prioritize spending 
within the organization 
and on infrastructure 
Coordination across 
the supply chain 
with relationships 
built across the 
different parties 
Adaptability 
Designed with intent 
for regular 
replacement or with 




Familiarity of roles and 
responsibilities across 
levels of the 
organization; cross 
trained employees; 
ability to engage 
leadership at all levels 
Ability to reschedule 
decision making and 








separate, but related 
agencies and within 
agencies; mutual 
understanding of the 











2.2.2 Measuring Resilience 
 In the literature, one may come across several proposed methodologies for 
measuring a system’s resilience to disruptions. Table 2.4 summarizes some of those 





Table 2.4: Proposed Methodologies and Metrics for Measuring Resilience 
Author Proposed Methodology 
Serulle 
(2010) 
Fuzzy systems approach to quantify resiliency at pre-event conditions using measurable 





Average speed reduction 




Level of intermodality 
Network management 
Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) 
Lane-miles/square-miles 
Hours or minutes 
%below speed limit 
Dollars/mile 
Dollars/mile 
Distance b/n key infrastructures/links 
Linguistic variable (low to high) 
Linguistic Variable (level 1 to level 5) 
Croope et 
al. (2010) 
Improving resiliency by using conceptual framework for a decision support system for 
critical infrastructure(CIR-DSS) repair, replacement and serviceability in a post-disaster 
environment by using 3 components: 
Component Description 
Spatial Decision Support System 
Infrastructure Management System 
                                                                                          
                                                         
Management Information System 
GIS/HAZUS-MH 
FEMA benefit/cost analysis principles: net 
present value, avoided damages, etc for highway 
asset management 
Based on resiliency concepts and principles 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
 
 The CIR-DSS is applied  considering : 
 Physical infrastructure conditions (deterioration and maintenance dynamics) 
 Functional assessments (practices of estimating life-cycle cost) 
 Vulnerability and damage assessment within specified location 
Measures of resilience and system performance used were measured before, during, 
immediately following event, during recovery and after restoration. 
 Capacity in veh/hr/ln 
 Number of available lanes 
 Pavement condition index 
Measures may differ depending on available information  




Utilizes notion of entropy to develop a framework to assess a systems resilience, i.e, 
the transportation system’s resilience is assessed on the basis of the resilience of its 
components. 
Analysis process: 
 Describe system 
 Evaluate system’s service level 
 Identify weaknesses 
Evaluation process: 
 Collection of data:  
o Properties of variables 
o Interdependencies between variables 
o  probabilities and impacts of adverse events on system 
 Application of notion of entropy: definition of system at both:  
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
 o Micro level: physical system, service provision and information 
system 
o Macro level:  some data to collect at this level include: 
 Nodes and links in the system 
 System capacity 
 Structural strength 
 Stability and robustness 
 Nature of system stresses 




Uses “evolutionary algorithm” as a transport network approach and  “load capacity” as 
a network resilience measure to evaluate resilience in traffic flow networks 
Leu et al. 
(2010) 
Paper f uses a GPS based network approach to assess network resiliency.  
Measures of resilience  
Component Variable Metric 





Average number of connections a node has 
The fraction of shortest paths between other nodes 
that pass through node i 







Probability that removal of node k breaks the 
network in n pieces 
Distance created by removal of a node is used as a 
proxy to estimate the cost of re-establishing the  
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
 





Zones 5km contours represent zones. Groups of nodes with 
similar topological integrity and distance gaps in 
zones and population size of that zones is used as a 
proxy to determine possible impact of an event on 
the local population 
Author Proposed Methodology 
Cox et 
al.(2010) 
Uses economic resilience approach to examine the contribution of trips to the value of 
goods and services they produce. 
Measures transportation system resiliency using 2 components: 
 Static resiliency: ability of an entity to maintain function, measured in % of 
maximum disruption avoided by resilience behaviors.  
 Where  
o Max. Disruption = reduction in pax journeys for the attacked mode 
o Resilience behaviors = increase in pax journeys for alternate modes 
 Dynamic resilience: capability to recover rapidly to achieve a desired state, i.e. 




Resilience of networks flow by use of optimization model with computational 




Uses network’s “vital paths” as resilience measure in an optimization model to 
evaluate network resiliency 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
Rosenkrantz 
et al.(2005) 
Maximum number of failures to a node that a network can tolerate- algorithms in 




Measures changes to accessibility levels at different network states to assess traffic 
flow resilience 
 
These methodologies for measuring a system’s resilience, although somewhat 
varied, are quite narrow, concentrating on only certain elements of the system. A 
combination of some of these methods with other resilience strategies that target other 
components of the transportation system will form the basis for a more holistic 












A FRAMEWORK FOR RESILIENCY PLANNING 
 This chapter presents a conceptual framework for resiliency planning in 
transportation systems to be used in state departments of transportation and similar 
agencies. The framework presented in this chapter is guided first by Meyer and Miller’s 
(2001) book on urban transportation planning and second, by work done by the Victoria 
Transportation Policy Institute on evaluating transportation resilience. This framework is 
a simplification of a very complex and multifaceted process given the diverse nature of 
resilience. Consequently, a case-by-case analysis approach is recommended in order to 
find suitable solutions along each dimension (Ta et al., 2009). The framework shown in 
Figure 3.1 shows how to incorporate resiliency planning into the broader approach to 
transportation planning, with the steps in red highlighting the areas where resiliency is 
considered. 
3.1 The Framework 
3.1.1 The Vision 
 The framework begins with the visioning stage. Every planning process begins 
with visioning; similarly, the state DOT or MPO using this framework has to clearly 
define its vision, whether it is for a new system or adapting an old one to increase 
resilience. This may be done through the integrated effort of the agency and the 
community, or by aligning with the national vision for critical infrastructure resilience. In 











These three desired states in the vision are based on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) vision of “a safe, 
secure, and resilient infrastructure so that the American way of life can thrive” (NPPD, 
2012).  A similar vision plan shown in Table 3.1 is offered by the Public Transportation 
System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide, developed by the Federal  
Transit Administration of the U.S. DOT. This visioning process is to enhance the security 
and emergency preparedness planning for public transportation systems.  
 
Table 3.1: Security and Emergency Management Planning Vision for Public Transportation 
Systems 
Source: FTA, 2003 
  
 As mentioned earlier, the agency may adopt any of the two sample visions 
presented or design their own, keeping in mind that the elements of resiliency should be 
present.  
3.1.2 Goals 
 After the vision is defined, the agency moves a step further by getting more 
specific and defining a set of goals to meet the vision of a safe, secure and resilient 
COMMIT to a program that enables the public transportation system to: 
 RESPOND decisively to events that cannot be prevented, mitigate loss, and 
protect employees, passengers, and emergency responders; 
 SUPPORT response to events that impact local communities, integrating 
equipment and capabilities seamlessly into the total effort; and  




transportation system. In this framework, the goals are based on the aspects of resiliency 
(Bruneau et al., 2003; Reggiani, 2012). That is, the goals of the agency should be related 
to: 
i. Reduced probability of failure 
ii. Reduced consequences of failure 
iii. Reduced time to recovery 
These goals make a system resilient and may be achieved through defining a set of 
agency objectives and the subsequent implementation of target specific strategies that 
touch on the different stages of the disaster life cycle: preparedness, mitigation, response 
and recovery (Beenhouwer et al., 2003).  
3.1.3 Objectives 
3.1.3.1 Define the System 
 Once the goals are clearly defined and understood, the objectives set may differ 
for each branch of the agency. That is, to set the objectives, the agency first needs to 
define the boundaries being dealt with (VTI, 2010). Similar to the TOSE dimensions of 
resilience in disaster research, the transportation system may also be said to have three 
dimensions i) the infrastructure dimension (technical), ii) the managing organization 
dimension (organizational) and iii) the user dimension (social and economic) (Tierney 
and Bruneau, 2007; Ta et al., 2009). Here, the infrastructure dimension comprises all 
physical components of the system such as highways, bridges, and railroads, as well as 
the technology associated with them. A good asset management program is required to 
inventory assets. The managing organization dimension is made up of the governing 
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bodies, institutions or agencies in charge of construction, maintenance and performance 
of the infrastructure (Ta et al., 2009). The user dimension refers to the communities that 
use the infrastructure and are affected by it either directly or indirectly. 
3.1.3.2 Identify Critical Functions 
 Following a clear definition of the dimension under consideration, the agency 
should then go ahead to identify its critical functions and assets, especially those that 
have a cascading effect when damaged. Ham and Lockwood (2002) define critical assets 
as “those major facilities, the loss of which would significantly reduce inter-regional 
mobility over an extended period and thereby damage the national economy and defense 
mobility.” For example, in the infrastructure dimension there are over 4 million miles of 
public roads; 46,000 interstate highways; 160,000 miles of rail; 600,000 bridges; 2 
million miles of pipeline; 500,000 train stations; and 300 tunnels; however, not all 
600,000 bridges or 47,000 miles of interstate highways are critical to the nation or even 
to a state (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2011; Pommerening, 2013; FHWA, 2011). 
Similarly in the managing organization dimension, where several divisions may exist, the 
critical functions of each of these divisions need to be defined. The agency may be 
comprised of divisions such as administrative, construction, engineering, finance, 
operations, planning, field services, maintenance, emergency and projects delivery 
divisions. An example of how criticality may be screened is by using the analytical tool 
shown in Table 3.2 which is a modified version of the tool developed by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in their efforts to identify critical assets for their work on mass 
transit antiterrorism practices. Expert opinion is required to determine the impact the loss 
of a particular transportation system asset has on 1) the users and operators of the system 
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(people) and 2) the ability to provide service (U.S. DOT, 2001). The losses may be 
graded in terms of monetary value, historical significance, operational significance or 
even public opinion (GAO, 1988). Functions ranked as high in both categories may then 
be included in the vulnerability analysis.  
  
Table 3.2: Function/Asset Criticality matrix 
Transportation System Unit 
Function/Asset  
Asset Loss Impact on 





Source: modified from U.S. DOT, 2001 
  
 For transportation infrastructure, Ukkusuri and Yushimito (2009), define the set 
of criteria to assess the criticality of a highway network as follows: 
i. Casualty Risk 
ii. Emergency Relief Function 
iii. National Recognition 
iv. Economic Disruption 
v. Collateral Damage Exposure 
vi. Military Support Function 
Another example of a criticality rating scale is that of Washington State DOT (WSDOT) 
shown in Figure 3.2. This scale is used to categorize their infrastructure assets and uses a 




Figure 3.2: WSDOT Rating Scale for Asset Criticality 
Source: WSDOT, 2011 
 
3.1.3.3 Identify and Categorize Vulnerabilities 
 
 “Mutual dependence and the interconnectedness made possible by the information and 
communications infrastructure lead to the possibility that our infrastructure may be vulnerable in 
ways that they never have been before.” 
– Critical Foundation: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, October 1997 
  
 Next, the agency should proceed to identify possible threats and categorize its 
vulnerabilities. This is a very important step because it is necessary to evaluate the 
vulnerabilities of critical sections of the system against specific threats. According to 
Labi (2013) as illustrated in Figure 3.3, threats to civil engineering systems may be 
external or internal, sudden or gradual, natural or man-made. Generally, threats may be 
identified from either historical data or based on expert opinion and the existence of 




Figure 3.3: Categories of Threats to Civil Engineering Systems 
Source: Labi, 2013. 
  
 Vulnerability is any weakness that makes the system susceptible to a disruption, 
and in this case cause catastrophic failure. A successful vulnerability assessment includes 
an in depth evaluation at the dimension level (infrastructure, user and managing 
organization). These threats and vulnerabilities must be updated periodically in an 
iterative manner in order to the account for the changing nature of threats, assess the 
effectiveness of implemented strategies and lessen the system’s vulnerability to 
uncertainty (Cox et al., 2010). For larger agencies with more resources, moving a step 
further to perform a complete risk assessment (including the probabilities of the various 
threats occurring) is preferred. With regards to the threat of extreme weather events, 
FHWA’s climate change risk assessment model for state DOTs and MPOs shown in 
Figure 3.4 may prove to be a useful tool which may be modified slightly to suit the 
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FHWA model during one of the pilot programs made modifications (shown in Figure 3.5) 
resulting in a model that was more for vulnerability assessment than risk assessment 
(WSDOT, 2011). FHWA currently has seven agencies in their 2013-2014 pilot 
vulnerability assessment programs. 
 
Figure 3.4: The FHWA Climate Change Risk Assessment Methodology 




Figure 3.5: WSDOT Recommended Vulnerability Assessment Methodology 




 On completion of these steps, the agency will now have a holistic understanding 
of the system and can now set specific objectives targeted at the most critical components 
of the system. 
3.1.4 Performance Measures 
 Once the objectives are set, performance measures are required for each of the 
identified objectives. The FHWA reports the specific definition of performance 
measurement from the National Performance Review as "a process of assessing progress 
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toward achieving predetermined goals, including information on the efficiency with 
which resources are transformed into goods and services (outputs), the quality of those 
outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and the extent to which clients are 
satisfied) and outcomes (the results of a program activity compared to its intended 
purpose), and the effectiveness of government operations in terms of their specific 
contributions to program objectives." In a broader sense, the NCHRP Project 8-32(02), 
Multimodal Transportation: Performance-Based Planning Process (1998) defines 
performance measurement as “The use of statistical evidence to determine progress 
toward specific defined organizational objectives. This includes both evidence of actual 
fact, such as measurement of pavement surface smoothness, and measurement of 
customer perception such as would be accomplished through a customer satisfaction 
survey. Performance measures provide information to managers about how well that 
bundle of services is being provided. Performance measures should reflect the 
satisfaction of the transportation service user in addition to those concerns of the system 
owner or operator.” 
 Currently, some state agencies already use performance measures especially for 
their infrastructure, mostly larger agencies in large population areas; however, several 
more have not yet adopted any measures and still rely on experience and intuition when 
evaluating strategies for improving conditions (NCHRP-311, 2003). According to 
Pickrell and Neuman (2000), adoption of performance measures in the planning process 
provides accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, improvement, clarity and better 
communication to customers and stakeholders. Performance measures adopted by some 
agencies may be categorized under mobility, accessibility, reliability and safety of the 
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system and should be specified for both pre- and post-disruption conditions. Table 3.3 
provides a summary of some performance measures currently in use by 35 U.S state 
DOTS and MPOS (NCHRP-311, 2003).   
 
Table 3.3: Performance Measures as Reported in a Survey of State DOTS and MPOS 
 
Source: NCHRP Synthesis 311, 2003 
 It is important that the performance measures adopted by an agency address the 
identified vulnerabilities of the system. To create or increase resiliency of the system, the 
performance measures should be categorized under robustness, redundancy, 
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resourcefulness and rapidity as shown in Figure 3.1. These criteria are not mutually 
exclusive, that is, strategies adopted to meet certain performance objectives under one 
category may also work to meet objectives set in another category. Bruneau et al., (2003) 
describe redundancy and resourcefulness as a “means” to the “ends” of robustness and 
rapidity. 
3.1.4.1 Robustness  
Robustness refers to the inherent strength or ability to withstand disruptions or shocks 
without significant degradation (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007). For infrastructure, 
performance measures under this criterion may include measures that check capacity, 
structural strength, stability, pavement condition and the amount of damage in dollars 
avoided in the event of a disruption. Use of a Network Robustness Index (NRI), as 
described by Scott et al., (2006) to assess network flows, link capacity and network 
topology would also be a useful measure for an agency. For the managing organization, 
performance measures that check its continued ability to carry out functions are also 
needed; for example, the percentage of employees still in service or the amount in dollars 
of direct and indirect economic losses avoided after a disruption (Bruneau et al., 2003).  
3.1.4.2 Redundancy 
 Redundancy refers to the extent to which other system elements can be substituted 
to perform particular functions. This may be in terms of actual excess capacity, diversity 
or adaptability in which a different means may provide for the same end results. For 
example, performance measures under this criterion for an agency’s critical infrastructure 
could be the number of alternative routes within a given radius, number of backups or 
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duplicate systems or equipment. In addition, the ability of the system to support different 
mode choices, such as transit (rail and bus), auto, biking and walking, to certain extents 
for users is a potential resilience objective. For the managing organization, increasing 
redundancy requires some amount of flexibility and adaptability. There should be cross 
training where possible, to increase the familiarity of roles and responsibilities among 
employees. Allowing for a certain amount of flexibility gives employees the ability to 
make decisions without adhering to regular chains of command during disruption can 
increase rapidity.  
3.1.4.3 Resourcefulness 
 Resourcefulness refers to “the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, 
and mobilize resources when conditions exist that threaten to disrupt some element, 
system, or a unit of analysis” (Bruneau et al., 2003). It may also refer to the agency’s 
capacity in terms of financial, technological, physical and informational resources 
(Bruneau et al., 2003). Thus, resourcefulness may be in human capacity terms or in terms 
of the wealth of an agency. In the managing organization dimension resourcefulness may 
be shown by an agency having various plans, models, policies and procedures to cope 
with emergencies or disruptions. For example, an agency may have a transportation 
security plan, a recovery plan, a risk management and vulnerability assessment plan, an 
emergency response plan, or even an economic recovery plan. It is important that 
agencies have all the necessary resources in order to be resilient. A study on freight 
resiliency in state DOTs conducted by the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics 
included a review of various state DOT transportation plans. The survey revealed that 
across the 50 state DOTs, 6 of them do not mention security at all in their transportation 
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plans, 18 mention security briefly but not as a separate section, 12 mention security with 
safety as a separate section, 9 mention security as a separate section by itself, and only 
two state DOTs had a separate document such as a security technical report (MIT-CTL, 
2006).  
  In the infrastructure dimension, agencies can adopt technologies that diagnose 
and detect infrastructure damage to reduce response time. For example, Bridge Hunter 
and Bridge Doctor are two near real-time highway bridge damage assessment tools 
developed by the University of New Mexico and ImageCat Inc., under a U.S.DOT and 
NASA joint program. Bridge Hunter uses remote sensing methods to register key features 
of bridges with airborne and satellite sensor images and Bridge Doctor then assesses the 
damage level based on pre and post event images captured.  Also, some bridges rebuilt 
after Hurricane Katrina were equipped with monitoring systems which included motion 
scales and other sensors to measure the weights of trucks, as well as to detect any impact 
on the infrastructure.  
3.1.4.4 Rapidity 
  Performance measures that are set under the rapidity criterion should be those that 
optimize the time to return to pre-event functional levels or better (Bruneau et al., 2003). 
This includes setting specified time frames for completion of activities, from restoration 
of road access to the time it takes to initiate response tasks. The use of decision support 
tools to prioritize access to scarce resources, as well as make investment decisions 
optimizes time spent in decision making. Also, improved technologies which aid in asset 
location, as well as damage extent and severity detection are all tools that increase 
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rapidity. Table 3.4 illustrates the different performance measure which may be set under 
the four criteria and across the three dimensions. 
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Table 3.4 (continued)  






Source: modified from Bruneau et al., (2003)  
 
 
3.1.5 Develop Resilience Strategies  
 The next stage involves the development of strategies to meet the previously set 
objectives, which also satisfy the performance measures set. These are actions or 
behaviors by the managing organization or its users that increase resilience (Cox et al., 
2010). As mentioned earlier, the properties of resilience are in not mutually exclusive, as 
such, any of the strategies developed and adopted may contribute to the increase of one or 
more resilience properties. Strategies that increase the autonomy, robustness, diversity 
and resourcefulness in a system’s critical components, ultimately create redundancy, 
efficiency, adaptability and rapidity of the system. They are those that usually target the 
infrastructure, the organization itself, its policies, resources and analysis procedures. 
These strategies should ultimately lead to a reduced probability to failure, reduced 
consequence of failure and a reduced time to recovery; consequently, they would cover 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.  
 The approach this framework takes in developing strategies is by dividing 
resilience strategies into two broad groups. First are the strategies that serve as a blockade 
to prevent any disruptions and also increase the inherent strength of the agency and its 
infrastructure; these are the resiliency barriers (Mansouri et al., 2009). They are mainly to 
prevent failure when possible or to mitigate any effects of a disruption that could have 
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dire consequences. Such strategies must include those that make critical components of 
the system self-correcting, repairable and autonomous, to ensure that failure of one 
component does not hinder or automatically lead to failure of other system components 
(VPI, 2010). They also include strategies that increase robustness such as enforcing strict 
design and building codes, as well as rigorous and regular inspections of infrastructure. A 
clear example of the omission of such as strategy is shown in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina which revealed the inadequacies and inaccuracies in the design and construction 
of the hurricane protection system. Also, according to Kunreuther (1997), about a third of 
the total damage sustained in Florida during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 could have been 
avoided if Florida’s state building codes were properly enforced. An agency may also 
ensure the use of only disaster-resistant designs for new constructions and retrofitting 
existing ones to increase strength. The use of sensors and other advanced technologies 
provide early detection of damaged infrastructure and hence, reduce the time to recovery. 
Strategies directed towards the agency as an organization with employees should be those 
that encourage effective communication and increase flexibility to enable rapid decision 
making during crises by cutting out regular bureaucracies (Petrenj et al., 2011). 
Redundancies created in the system also facilitate required role substitutions during 
emergencies. Strategies that increase diversity such as providing a wide array of mode 
choices (e.g. bus, heavy rail, light rail, bicycling, etc.) for travelers must be included. For 
example, after the 2005 London train bombings, the availability of other mode choices 
provided a substitute for commuters during and immediately after the incidents. There 
was an observed increase in the use of other modes of travel (Cox et al., 2010). Other 
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strategies include maintaining emergency stockpiles, creating excess capacity, and 
continually finding new ways of increasing efficiency.  
 The second set of strategies consists of those that take effect just before, during 
and after a disruption. They comprise response and recovery strategies that are mainly 
contingency plans, policies and procedures, instituted by the agency that increase 
resiliency. It must be emphasized here that response is not equal to recovery. Although 
the two may overlap, they are distinct in nature. Response can be defined as “all actions 
taken prior to, during, and just after an incident with the onus on saving lives, minimizing 
damage, and recuperation over the long term” whereas recovery involves “post-event 
actions taken to return vital economic systems to minimum standards of health in the 
short term and to full health over a longer period” (MIT-CTL, 2006). Bus drivers’ 
working overtime in the event of a disaster, for example, is a response strategy which was 
unavailable to New Orleans’ transit dependent population during Hurricane Katrina, 
worsening the overall effects of the disaster (Litman, 2006).  
 Other examples of resilience strategies can be seen in in Hurricane Sandy’s recent 
impact on New York’s transportation system. Published reports in the aftermath of the 
disaster identified some of the New York MTA’s infrastructure vulnerabilities as (i) the 
disruption of service from power outages as a result of extreme precipitation events, and 
(ii) their low-lying transportation systems such as the subways and passenger car tunnels 
which put them at risk of storm surge, flooding from rising sea levels and extreme 
precipitation events (Rosenzweig, 2013). In response, certain strategies to be 
implemented in their operations and management departments include improving drain 
maintenance, adjusting travel routes, reducing travel frequency, changing repair cycles to 
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anticipate ongoing repairs to damaged infrastructure and the movement of rolling stock to 
high ground in advance of storms (Rosenzweig, 2013). Other strategies that require 
capital investment in infrastructure include retrofitting existing vulnerable infrastructure, 
installation of pumps to reduce flooding of vulnerable facilities and hardening to prevent 
exposure of certain infrastructure from the elements (Rosenzweig, 2013). The agency 
also acknowledged the importance of strategies that target their current policies such as 
integrating climate risks into the locations of their transportation projects, avoiding the 
implementation of projects such as the construction roads and rail in vulnerable areas 
(Rosenzweig, 2013). 
 
3.1.6 Evaluation and Decision Analysis 
 The implementation of resilience strategies, whether to improve inherent 
resilience at design level, or to increase the overall resilience of a system at a later time 
may be a costly investment. However, when compared with possible future benefits, 
implementation of these strategies will more often than not prove to be wise investments. 
As part of the development of strategies, a set of alternatives also need to be developed. 
The process of defining alternatives may include the “no action” alternative where all the 
tradeoffs, benefits or costs of not implementing certain strategies are outlined. There are 
various methods suggested by federal and state agencies for defining alternatives such as 
those of the FTA or FHWA (FTA, 2005; FHWA, 2010).  
 After a set of strategies and alternatives are developed, it is important to evaluate 
them under certain criteria to enable decision makers select among alternatives. 
Evaluation is “the process of determining the desirability of different courses of action 
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and of presenting this information to decision makers in a comprehensive and useful 
form” (Meyer and Miller, 2001, pg. 484). During this stage, questions about 
appropriateness, efficiency, equity, effectiveness, adequacy, feasibility and sensitivity 
must be addressed (Meyer and Miller, 2001). According to Meyer and Miller (2001), 
evaluation should have the following characteristics: 
- Focus on the decisions being faced by decision makers. 
- Relate the consequences of alternatives to goals and objectives. 
- Determine the effects of the proposal on different groups. 
- Be sensitive to the time frame in which project impacts are likely to occur. 
- In the case of regional transportation planning, produce information on the likely 
impacts of alternatives at a level of aggregation that permits varying levels of 
assessment. 
- Analyze the implementation requirements of each alternative. 
- Assess the financial feasibility of the actions recommended in the plan. 
- Provide information to decision makers on the value of alternatives in a readily 
understandable form and in a timely manner. 
  These characteristics, however, may be modified to suit an agency’s needs. In 
effect, the agency needs to specify the evaluation criteria and the subsequent method (e.g. 
cost-effectiveness, benefit-cost, lifecycle cost analysis, etc.) to be used to arrive at the 
final decision (Litman, 2001). This framework proposes the use of decision analysis tools 
which assess the costs and benefits of the proposed strategies, mainly because the 
implementation of most transportation investments relies heavily on the availability of 
funds. Such decision analysis tools include net present value (NPV), return on investment 
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(ROI), real option valuation, internal rate of return (IRR), sensitivity analysis, payback 
time, decision tree analysis or multi criteria decision analysis (www.innovation 
management.org, 2007). The use of these tools helps in prioritizing strategies to 
implement and the eventual selection process.   
 
3.1.7 Implement Resilience Strategies 
 The final step of the framework is to finally implement the vetted strategies. 
Whether the strategies to increase resilience are to retrofit existing infrastructure, change 
design standards, implement policies, or to cross-train employees, all the implemented 
strategies need to be monitored to determine their performance. Over time, some of these 
strategies may change due to the changing nature of threats or to accommodate changes 




PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF RESILIENCY IN THE 
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS 
 
 This chapter is a preliminary review of the long-range transportation plans of 
three state DOTs, chosen for their diversity of locations and without any preconceived 
notions about their incorporation of resiliency. State 1 is located in the Pacific Northwest 
and serves a population of about 4 million people. State 2 is located in the South Atlantic 
sub region of the U.S. and serves a population of approximately 10 million. Last, State 3 
is a Midwest state with a population of about 10 million. Currently among the three state 
agencies, there are no formal resiliency planning processes; however, some of their 
current plans and policies on emergency operations, safety and security contribute to 
some extent to the agency’s level of resilience. This resiliency planning deficiency may 
be due in part to the fact that there are currently no federal policies that require state 
transportation agencies to adopt such planning methods. 
 In this preliminary review, statewide long-range transportation plans (STP) from 
the three agencies are assessed with the main elements of the resiliency framework 
provided in the previous chapter. 
 
4.1 The Preliminary Review  
 Table 4.1 below is a matrix which identifies elements of resiliency across the 
three state plans. It is noteworthy that across all three state transportation plans, there is 
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no mention of transportation system resilience. All three plans, however, include sections 
on safety and security. Safety within the context of these plans refers to reducing the risk 
of transportation-related crashes and security involves reducing the exposure to criminal 
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 The visions for two of the agencies, State 1 and State 3, contain elements of 
resiliency as they promote the safety and security of people, goods, services and 
information. All three plans support diversity by means of encouraging multimodality, 
diverse transportation energy sources or both. This diversity increases the system’s 
resilience by providing alternate modes of travel during a disruption and lesser impact in 
times of possible fuel shortages. These plans also prioritize mobility and accessibility 
which are important in the event of a crisis, especially for the section of the public that 
are transportation disadvantaged.  Good mobility and accessibility also aid in evacuations 
and the transportation of resources during recovery efforts. Furthermore, the plan for 
State 1 supports adopting new technology and transportation demand management 
(TDM) strategies. TDM strategies are known to increase an agency’s diversity and 
flexibility, as well as improve resource management and communication, thereby 
improving the agency’s resiliency (VTI, 2010). The use of ITS and other technology to 
improve the efficiency and safety of infrastructure by offering increased protection and 
preservation, naturally increase system resilience. In addition, two of the agencies 
promote coordination, communication and cooperation within their agency, between their 
agency and other agencies, and also, between their agency and system users. This can 
work to increase the overall system efficiency and effectiveness -- thereby increasing 
resilience.  
 State 2’s long-range transportation plan narrows itself by concentrating on only 
asset management and future surface transportation capacity expansion needs. It does not 
include any new policies that support system resiliency. On the whole, State 3 seems to 
64 
 
be the best equipped and prepared for natural and man-made disasters, although there is 
still room for improvement.   
 To conclude this section, it is worthy to note that all three agencies implement 
projects that in one way or the other increase the system’s resiliency. For instance, the 
performance of seismic retrofits for vulnerable bridges by State 1 or the vulnerability 
assessments for bridges along international borders by State 3. These isolated strategies 
are commendable and must be continued but only contribute a fraction to the overall 
system’s resilience. Without a clear vision and a well-structured plan to tie all efforts of 
an agency together, many sections will eventually be overlooked creating loopholes in 
the system which may be problematic in the event of a major disruption. Second, it is 
general knowledge that all local and regional transportation plans are consistent with a 
state’s long-range transportation plan. Without resiliency as a priority in the STP, the 












Transportation plays a major role in the quality of life of the people it serves. The 
failure of transportation systems during catastrophic events exacerbates the effects of 
such disasters by breaking the links between important life-line facilities, bringing 
mobility to a halt and hindering response efforts. Unfortunately, current transportation 
planning methods are deficient in elements that increase resilience. This thesis presents a 
framework to incorporate resiliency into the broader context of transportation planning. 
Such planning methods are now necessary due to the increase in future uncertainties 
concerning both natural and manmade catastrophic events.  
This work first presents a brief overview of the impact past catastrophic climate-
related events have had on certain transportation infrastructure, and the economic losses 
associated with those events. It then presents the concept of resiliency and how it can be 
applied to transportation planning through the resiliency framework. Last, three long-
range transportation plans are assessed for elements of resiliency using the framework 
and some recommendations are made.  
As of now, we are still unable to predict the occurrence of natural and manmade 
disasters, which leaves some element of uncertainty concerning the timing and intensity 
of such events. This implies that even with the implementation of certain resilience 
measures, we may never be fully protected from the effects of these events, but since the 
focus of resiliency is to “fail gracefully” and bounce back rapidly rather than “resist” 
such events, the effects of such disasters may be lessened from catastrophic to 
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manageable by anticipating such failures (Foster, 1997; Fisher, 2013). The problem now 
is that resilience is usually an afterthought, only considered after a disaster has already 
occurred. For example, the New York City Governor’s plans to invest $20 billion in a 
resiliency plan after Hurricane Sandy to protect New York from the negative impacts of 
climate change (Dillow, 2013).  
With regards to state DOTs, the issue of inadequate funding is mostly the main 
reason for not adopting more resilient approaches and strategies. Other DOTs may also 
be averse to strategies that are novel or innovative, mostly because of their uncertainty 
about the benefits of resiliency, which may be attributed to uncertainty in the prediction 
of future catastrophic natural or manmade events. As such, further research is required in 
to evaluate the benefits and costs of resiliency planning in state DOTs, as well as 
aggregating data that provides evidence of the benefits of resiliency planning in order to 
make evidence-based decisions on investments. In the meantime, investments that 
increase a system’s resilience may be funded through reallocation from other areas (DfT, 
2011). This requires all future investments (including those that increase resiliency), to be 
assessed with the same evaluation criteria to justify such reallocations (DfT, 2011).  To 
give resilience investments a wide range of potential financial support, it is important that 
they each have a broad range of benefits (Foster, 1997).   
To conclude, it is important to develop federal policies that require critical asset 
vulnerability assessments at the state level and the development of subsequent strategies 
that increase resilience. However, with or without such policies state DOTs would still 
benefit from thinking about the application of resiliency frameworks, such as the one 
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offered in this thesis, and assessing the costs and benefits of such measures to increase 
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